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1 Introduction
The recent Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) revolution has favoured
the development of numerous innovative workplace practices in most OECD countries.
Work organization inside firms evolved from specialization to multi-tasking, and flexible
forms of workplace organization have largely diffused in most OECD economies.
Parallel to this trend, we can also observe an increasing employment share of skilled
workers in major OECD countries during the 1990s along with the dissemination of ICT.
A definitely much less stressed aspect of organizational change, which is central in
this paper, is the impact on human resources departments. In general, one would expect
that the role of such department will be significantly altered in a situation where flexible
forms of work organization are so massively adopted. Indeed, a quick look at the data
confirms this intuition. In particular, the management ratio (managers as percentage
of the workforce) increased in many OECD countries during the twentieth century, but
started decreasing in the early 2000s. In France for instance, the percentage of workers
employed in managerial and professional specialty occupations rose from 7.1% in 1982 to
11.1% in 2000 and decreased to 4.8% in 2004. Similarly, this ratio ranges from 10.5% in
1970 to 14.6% in 2000 and 13.9% in 2004 in the United States.
In the light of all these data, the evolution of skills, job content and work organization
observed in many OECD countries over the past decades can be summarized in the fol-
lowing three main characteristics: 1) an increase in the proportion of workers employed in
managerial occupations, together with a recent decrease since the ICT revolution; 2) the
diffusion of innovative workplace practices based on multi-tasking and computer use; 3)
an increase in skills requirements.
This paper studies the determination of the optimal number of tasks performed per
worker in an economy where individuals devote time to production and human capital
accumulation, and where multi-tasking both increases production and gives rise to coor-
dination costs. In particular, we shall distinguish between horizontal coordination costs,
which involve the costs of coordinating the tasks accomplished by each production worker,
and vertical coordination costs, which reflect coordinating different workers and mainly
concern workers employed in human resources services. We then examine how the economy
reacts to permanent exogenous technological accelerations, and we find that the model is
able to reproduce the three stylized facts outlined above.
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2 The model
The model proposed in this paper considers an economy in discrete time (from 0 to∞) with
an active population of size L. The firm occupational structure is composed of two types
of jobs: human resources jobs (in fraction ρ of the workforce employed) and production
jobs (in fraction 1 − ρ of the workforce employed). Workers devote time to production
(either in the human resources service or in the production service) and to human capital
accumulation.
2.1 Technology and coordination costs
The economy is characterized by a representative firm that produces a homogeneous (nu-
meraire) good according to the following technology:
yt = At · [(1− ρt) · ht · Tt · Lt]1−α nαt 0 < α < 1
where At is a productivity parameter, Lt is the volume of hours worked with human capital
ht, Tt is worker’s productive time, nt is the number of tasks performed per worker and ρt
is the fraction of the workforce in the personnel (human resources) service.
Producing the good implies two types of costs: production costs and coordination
costs. Since production requires physical resources and knowledge about how to combine
them, production costs correspond to traditional costs of transforming inputs into output
(physical - productive - resources expenses) whereas coordination costs correspond to the
costs of combining and managing interactions and dependencies between resources (tasks
and/or workers). In our model, labour is the sole input, therefore production costs equal
the total wage bill and coordination costs depend on the number of tasks realized per
worker (n) and on the fraction of workers in the human resources service (ρ).
The firm’s profits (given that output is the numeraire) then write:
πt = At · [(1− ρt) · ht · Tt · Lt]1−α nαt − C (n, ρ)− wt · ht · Tt · Lt
where wt is the wage rate per efficiency unit of labour and C (n, ρ) represents coordination
costs measured as pure output loss.
The coordination costs function depends on horizontal and vertical coordination costs
as follows:
C(n, ρ) =
h(n, ρ) · v(ρ)
d
where h(n, ρ) denotes horizontal coordination costs and v(ρ) denotes vertical coordination
costs, while d reflects the extent of coordination costs (a higher d reduces the importance
or magnitude of coordination costs).
We then assume:
h (n, ρ) = nξ · (1− ρ)θ
where ξ, θ > 0, i.e. horizontal coordination costs increase with the number of tasks per
capita n and with the size of the production service (1− ρ), given elasticities parameters
ξ and θ, and also:
v (ρ) = ρη
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where η can be positive or negative, i.e. vertical coordination costs depend on the share of
workers in the human resources service (when η > 0 they are an increasing function of this
share, and this corresponds to a more bureaucratic situation, while when η < 0 they are
a decreasing function of this share, and this corresponds to a less bureaucratic situation).
At this point in the decentralized economy the firm’s optimization program is given
by:
max
nt,Tdt ,ρt
πt = At
h
(1− ρt)htT dt Lt
i1−α
nαt −
nξt (1− ρt)
θ ρηt
dt
− wthtT dt Lt
where dt > 0 and where T dt denotes now the working time demanded by the firm.
2.2 Household and human capital accumulation
The household in the economy has a utility function given by:
u (ct) = ln ct
and it is endowed with one unit of time supplied each period, that is spent on working (the
fraction T st ) or on human capital accumulation (the fraction 1−T st ), and the accumulation
of human capital is described by the following equation:
ht+1 = Et · hδt · (1− T st )1−δ 0 < δ < 1
where Et is an efficiency parameter.
The household’s intertemporal optimization program in the decentralized economy is
then given by:
max
{ct,T st ,at+1,ht+1}∞t=0
∞X
t=0
βt ln ct
s.t.
at+1 = (1 + rt) at + wthtT st − ct
ht+1 = Ethδt (1− T st )1−δ
where β is the discount factor (with 0 < β < 1) and at represents the assets held in t.
2.3 Market equilibrium conditions
Together with the solution of the problem of the firm and of the household, the stationary
equilibrium of the decentralized economy is characterized also by the market equilibrium
condition:
yt = ct +
nξt (1− ρt)
θ ρηt
dt
and by the labour market equilibrium condition:
T dt = T st = Tt
It is now possible to derive the optimality and equilibrium conditions of the model, the
steady-state values of the different variables and the associated comparative statics for the
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decentralized economy. Finally, it is possible to consider some simulation exercises in order
to examine how the economy reacts to permanent exogenous technological accelerations.
The important aspect is that the model is able to reproduce the three stylized facts that
emerge from the data. Indeed, it delivers a permanent trend towards multi-tasking and
human capital accumulation following permanent technological accelerations, while the
size of the human resources department (that is the fraction of workers devoted to reduce
coordination costs) is also significantly raised and then reduced. In conclusion, the model
behaves extremely well in replicating the organizational features of the ICT revolution.
3 Conclusion
This paper develops a model to analyze the intensity of multi-tasking under various exoge-
nous technological accelerations. The model has two original characteristics: it includes
endogenous coordination costs, and it introduces the size of the human resources depart-
ment as a key variable for the firms to control their coordination costs. In our modelling,
and building on recent economic and management literature, we distinguish between ver-
tical and horizontal coordination costs, which proves crucial in the equilibrium properties
of the model. The model also includes endogenous human capital accumulation, and
therefore brings together enough ingredients to study some highly relevant stylized facts
identified in OECD data. Although technological progress is exogenous in our set-up, and
no technology adoption decision is to be taken, we believe that the model offers a useful
shortcut to analyze the consequences of technological accelerations on workplace organi-
zation. The fact that all performed numerical simulations corroborate the ability of the
model to replicate the observed stylized facts is a good indication of that.
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